RFC-0048 · Design Q&A
Versioned draft snapshot
RFCs, reference catalogs, and evidence reflect Spec 3b2e3e7a114fb826b1445d39a48756b8fff629cd. Counts and pending/status notes belong to that snapshot. Read the dated project update for later progress.
Source repositories are private during staging. Links marked “repository access required” need access to the linked repository.
Q: How can an anonymous session with no scopes access public read operations?
A: Approved 2026-10-04: the request-only anonymous session has only the kernel-owned public scope, which grants explicitly published read-only, non-tenant operations (RFC-0048 §§3.5, 5.1, 6.4).
Source: RFC-0048 §§3.5, 5.1, 6.4; RFC-0033 §6.3
Issue: Anonymous sessions have scopes: [], and effective capabilities are an intersection with session scopes; an empty intersection is denied. The same RFC says anonymous callers may invoke read-only public APIs.
Recommendation: Define an explicit public capability class and read-only anonymous authorization path, with no implicit access to tenant-scoped data.
Q: How are logout and principal deactivation enforced for stateless session tokens?
A: Approved 2026-10-04: every privileged request checks authoritative session or revocation state, including for signed tokens (RFC-0048 §§7.3–7.5, 8.2–8.3).
Source: RFC-0048 §§6.1, 7.3–7.5, 8.2–8.3 Issue: Active invalidation and next-request principal deactivation checks are mandatory, but the JWT-style option says no server-side storage is required and revocation uses signing-key rotation. Rotating a shared key cannot selectively revoke one session, and a self-contained token cannot prove current principal status without a lookup. Recommendation: Require a revocation or session-version lookup for stateless tokens, or narrow their guarantees and prohibit them where selective invalidation is required.
Q: Which authenticator selection rule governs multiple providers?
A: Approved 2026-10-04: RFC-0041 selects one AuthenticationService provider; its credential strategies return explicit Unsupported, Rejected, or Authenticated outcomes, and only Unsupported continues the chain (RFC-0048 §6.3).
Source: RFC-0048 §6.3; RFC-0041 §9.3; RFC-0040 §5.2
Issue: RFC-0048 tries authenticators in declaration order until one returns a session, while RFC-0041 selects one provider per token using override/category/install order. authenticate is typed to return Session, not a nullable no-match result.
Recommendation: Distinguish a chain of credential-specific authenticators from the single AuthenticationService provider, define no-match and error semantics, and make ordering consistent across RFCs.
Q: Which fields are mandatory in the audit record for authentication method?
A: Approved 2026-10-04: AuditLogEntry includes the verified authMethod; anonymous and internal calls use their named methods (RFC-0047 §3.1; RFC-0048 §9.3). Failed attempts before an operation begins remain governed by the authentication diagnostic and audit policy.
Source: RFC-0048 §§6.2, 9.3, 10 invariant 10; RFC-0047 §3.1
Issue: RFC-0048 requires audit to record authMethod, but RFC-0047’s authoritative AuditLogEntry schema has no such field.
Recommendation: Add a versioned authentication-method field to the audit record and define its value for anonymous, internal, and failed-authentication attempts.
Q: How is identity delegation authenticated on outbound calls?
Status: Open
Source: RFC-0048 §9.2; RFC-0024
Issue: The runtime may forward a principal identity in an X-Forwarded-Principal style header, but the RFC does not require a trusted channel, signed assertion, audience restriction, or receiver validation. A header alone is forgeable.
Recommendation: Define a signed, audience-bound delegation token or mTLS-bound service assertion and require the receiving service to validate it before accepting the identity.
Q: What schema governs Principal, Session, and Credential across service boundaries?
Status: Open
Source: RFC-0048 §§3.1, 4.1, 6.1, 8.2 Issue: These types cross request, provider, and persistence boundaries, but are informal shapes with open maps and no versioned serialization or unknown-field rules. Recommendation: Define protobuf messages and a discriminated credential oneof, with an explicit mapping to persisted graph resources and signed-token claims.