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Docs/RFC-0047/Design Q&A

RFC-0047 · Design Q&A

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Q: How is successful audit emission atomic with an operation’s graph commit?

Status: Open

Source: RFC-0047 §§3.1–3.2; RFC-0043 §9.2 steps 11–13 Issue: RFC-0047 makes durable audit a precondition of successful completion and calls for rollback on audit failure, but RFC-0043 commits the operation before emitting audit. A failure after commit cannot roll back the graph mutation; an unavailable audit sink also makes the exactly-one-entry rule impossible. Recommendation: Persist a versioned audit record or outbox entry in the same transaction as the mutation, then define delivery/retry and how pre-transaction failures are audited.

Q: What serialized schema governs audit records consumed outside the runtime?

Status: Open

Source: RFC-0047 §§1, 3.1, 10 Issue: AuditLogEntry is an informal shape even though records cross process and storage boundaries and consumers depend on field identity. Nullability, enum evolution, versioning, and unknown-field behavior are unspecified. Recommendation: Define a versioned protobuf AuditLogEntry and an explicit storage/export mapping, with compatibility tests for legacy consumers.

Q: How are sensitive values protected in hashes and error text?

Status: Open

Source: RFC-0047 §§3.3, 6.2–6.5 Issue: Unsalted SHA-256 placeholders for low-entropy fields can be guessed offline. Substring replacement against known secret values will miss transformed, encoded, truncated, or previously unknown sensitive data in messages and stack traces. The claim that the post-redaction input hash verifies identical original input is false when sensitive fields are omitted. Recommendation: Use structured field-level allowlisting, omit sensitive values by default, and use keyed hashes only where correlation is required and approved. Define precisely what argHash commits to.

Q: What guarantees apply to operation attempts that fail before resolution or during audit outage?

Status: Open

Source: RFC-0047 §§3.1–3.2, 9 invariant 1; RFC-0043 §9.2 Issue: The schema requires an operation FQN and exactly one record for every invocation, but an unknown operation fails before an FQN can be resolved. A failed operation with a failed audit sink can produce no record while still returning its original error. Recommendation: Separate invocation attempts from resolved operation executions, define fallback audit persistence and eventual-delivery semantics, and state a measurable failure policy when no sink is available.

Q: How are caller-supplied correlation IDs bounded and normalized?

Status: Open

Source: RFC-0047 §§7.1–7.4 Issue: The runtime accepts an opaque caller value into audit, trace, event, and outbound headers without specifying length, character restrictions, or handling of duplicate headers. Oversized or control-character values can impair downstream logs and propagation. Recommendation: Define a bounded URL-safe grammar and reject or replace invalid inbound IDs before they enter any emission boundary.